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Christian Beyer, referring to a combination of Husserl’s and Searle’s theses, pro-
poses an account of meaning that is context-dependent and that expresses not
only propositional content but also the intentional state of the speaker. However,
he tries to weaken Searle’s Background Hypothesis, which should be restricted
only to the speaker. Thus he excludes from the relation of intentional directedness
the third element (called either the hearer, interpreter, or consumer). I will argue
that if avoiding radical contextualism is right, it cannot be implemented at the
cost of the Background Hypothesis and the triadic relation of intentionality.
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1 Introduction
Since the linguistic turn the main problems con-
sidered by philosophers of mind and language
are the questions of how words connect with the
world, what relations exist between words and
objects,  what  makes  utterances  true  or  false,
and how we can extrapolate propositional con-
tent  from  internal  mental  states  on  external
reality. These are particular questions that stem
from the general issue of meaning. Our target
article is concerned with the question of grasp-
ing the meaning and intention that stands be-
hind  expressions  in  the  process  of  producing
and interpreting assertive utterances. Its author
argues for the thesis that meaning is context-de-
pendent,  but  in  order  to  properly  grasp  the
meaning  of  utterances  one  does  not  need  to
have  knowledge-how,  characterized  by  John
Searle  in  the  form of  so-called  “Background”.
Instead,  the author proposes a  neo-Husserlian
conception that allows the reading of intentions
standing behind assertions, without reference to
factors coming from external context—although
this is not an internalistic standpoint. However,
taking this position he excludes from the rela-
tion of intentionality its third element, namely
the hearer (interpreter), depriving him of some
kind  of  responsibility  for  knowledge  about
factors  determining  the  truthfulness  of  asser-
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tions. He believes that for the hearer to under-
stand literal meaning knowledge-how is not ne-
cessary. 
This  commentary  presents  four  objec-
tions against Beyer’s arguments about under-
standing  the  meaning  of  sentences  and  one
separate criticism of his approach to the prob-
lem of intentionality. At the beginning I shall
reconstruct  the  thesis  and  arguments  of  the
author. In the following sections the theses of
Beyer  will  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the
general question: what does it mean for mean-
ing to be context-dependent? Here the issue of
the differences between contextual and literal
meaning  will  be  discussed  with  reference  to
Searle’s  Background  Hypothesis.  The  line  of
the argumentation will rest on four objections
to Beyer’s claim about the restriction of  the
Hypothesis, and will focus on: (1) the problem
of indexicals;  (2) the distinction between lit-
eral and contextual meaning; (3) semantic and
social  externalism;  and (4)  understanding  as
epistemic triangle. The last part of the com-
mentary will be concerned with intentionality
considered as a triadic relation strongly con-
nected with the model of understanding. This
assumption  should lead  to an answer  to the
question of why we cannot reduce the require-
ments of  the Background Hypothesis to pro-
ducers only.
Even  at  this  early  stage,  according  to
Beyer’s account, we might ask whether, if the
interpreter  of  the  article  in  question  was  to
misunderstand the article, who has made the
mistake—the  speaker  (producer,  author)  or
the hearer (consumer, reader)? This is another
open question that shall accompany this com-
mentary.
2 Précis of Meaning, Context, and 
Background
Arguing for a version of meaning that is context
dependent, yet still accessible to every compet-
ent language user,  Beyer combines two stand-
points toward the relation between meaning and
intentionality in  the work of  Edmund Husserl
and  John  Searle.  Linking  the  theses  of  both
philosophers, he assumes that:
1. The meaning of assertive utterances is con-
text dependent.
2. Assertive utterances express not only propos-
itional content but also an intentional state.
3. Searle’s Background Hypothesis about the re-
quirement of non-intentional background on
the part of the speaker and hearer for recog-
nizing intentional states expressed by assert-
ive utterances as well as for grasping the re-
spective meaning of the utterances could be
relevant to an understanding of the context-
dependency of assertive utterances, but only
in a restricted form. 
Beyer’s main thesis can be summarized as fol-
lows:
The speaker uttering a sentence intention-
ally presents herself as performing or undergo-
ing an act, but if the hearer does not recognize
that  intention,  she  does  not  thereby  fail  to
grasp  the  literal  truth-conditional  meaning  of
an utterance. Hence, only the group of speakers
(utterance  producers)  must  meet  the  require-
ments of Searle’s Background Hypothesis.
In other words, according to Beyer,  con-
text  dependence  does  not  prevent  competent
language users who lack the correct background
from  grasping  the  literal  truth-conditional
meaning of an utterance. 
Beyer gives brilliant examples, which jus-
tify this main claim. The first group contains
indexicals  like  “I”,  “here”,  and  “now”,  which
share  the  same  general  meaning  function—
which  I  generally  prefer  to  call  “sense”  or
“concept”—but which have different respective
meanings, that is, a different extension. Take an
example,  in  which  Subject  1  asserts:  “I  have
blood type A”, and Subject 2 also asserts: “I
have blood type A”. Both utterances have the
same general meaning-function, but express dif-
ferent  truth-conditional  contents—or  proposi-
tions. Using an alternative philosophical termin-
ology, they have the same intension but differ-
ent extension, which results in the famous con-
clusion that intension does not determine exten-
sion (Putnam 1975). However, according to Hil-
ary Putnam’s Twin Earth Thought Experiment,
even natural kinds “have an indexical unnoticed
component” (1975, p. 152). This forces the con-
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clusion that every sentence is somehow context
dependent, including those containing concepts
of natural kinds.
To the second group of  examples belong
sentences without established uses, such as have
been  proposed  by  Searle:  “Bill  opened  the
mountain”;  “Sally  opened  the  grass”;  “Sam
opened the sun”. As Searle claims, in the case of
such sentences we have no clear idea what they
mean, or else we fail to find a proper way of un-
derstanding the sentences because we lack the
necessary  background  capacities  and  social
practices.
We know how to open doors, books, eyes,
wounds and walls;  and the differences in
the  Network  and  in  the  Background  of
practices produce different understandings
of the same verb. Furthermore, we simply
have  no  common  practices  of  opening
mountains, grass, or suns. It would be easy
to invent a Background, i.e., to imagine a
practice, that would give a clear sense to
the idea of opening mountains, grass, and
suns, but we have no such common Back-
ground at present. (Searle 1983, p. 147)
However, Beyer claims that even if we do not
have the background we can still grasp the lit-
eral meaning of such sentences. We lack know-
ledge  about  verification—here  Beyer  agrees
with  Emma Borg (2004)—i.e.,  knowledge-
how, but we can still understand the sentence.
Another example given by Beyer concerns
situations where the speaker utters a sentence
that the hearer repeats, while referring to an-
other  object  than  that  referred  to  by  the
speaker. In other words, the hearer mistakenly
takes for entitlement1 an uttered claim about an
object, which he thinks is the right referent—for
example,  when saying  “This  is  red”,  the  sen-
tence refers to a ball in a box, which the hearer
does not know about because he has seen only a
1 The terminus technicus “entitlement” plays an important role in
the philosophy of Robert Brandom, built on the inferential role
of the semantic. In Brandom’s account, understanding relies on
the participation of subjects in a language game of giving and
asking for reasons, where entitlement can be defined as “giving
a reason”  for  repeating  the judgment as  being true about the
object  it  concerns.  I  thank  Daniel  Żuromski  for  pointing  this
out.
red apple being put into the box. Beyer claims
that,  according  to  the  principle  of  knowledge
maximization formulated by Timothy William-
son, the speaker should be regarded still as pos-
sessing some knowledge about the apple, even if
he has a false belief about that object, because
even a false judgment in certain circumstances
can  count  as  knowledgeable.  However,  Beyer
proposes a modification of this principle, which
should, according to him, be “supplemented by
a more traditional theory of justification, draw-
ing upon notions of  observation,  memory and
testimony” (Beyer this collection). From the ex-
amples given above Beyer infers that contextu-
alism is the right account for this phenomenon,
but only in a form that allows minimal semantic
knowledge concerning the literal meaning, which
can be possessed even in the absence of Back-
ground.
3 What does it mean for meaning to be 
context-dependent? 
Epistemic or semantic contextualism has been
created  as  an  answer  to  a  sceptical  challenge
against  knowledge  in  the  sense  of  episteme—
defined as justified, true belief. It is claimed in
this conception that the satisfaction conditions
for “x knows that p”—i.e., the truth-conditions
of sentences—on whose basis we ascribe know-
ledge  to  a  subject,  depend on the  context  in
which they are uttered, i.e., on epistemic stand-
ards obtaining in these contexts (cf. Palczewski
2013, p. 197). “Contextualists speak of the se-
mantic value of knowledge ascriptions as some-
how shifting  with  context  […]  The  parameter
that  shifts  with  the  context  may  be  the
threshold of justification, the standard of epi-
stemic  position,  the set  of  epistemic  alternat-
ives” (Preyer & Peter 2005, p. 3). 
In contrast to contextual respective mean-
ing,  for  literal  truth-conditional  meaning  we
have  to  look  to  semantic  content.  As  Searle
claims, it is a meaning with “zero context”, de-
termined by the meaning of its semantic com-
ponents  and  syntactic  rules  of  composition.
However, “for a large class of sentences there is
no such thing as the zero or null context for the
interpretation of sentences, and that as far as
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our semantic  competence is  concerned we un-
derstand  the  meaning  of  such  sentences  only
against a set of background assumptions about
the contexts in which the sentence could be ap-
propriately uttered” (Searle 1978, p. 207). 
The distinction between literal and contex-
tual meaning is clear for Beyer. Literal meaning
is not usage. It is a subject of the semantics but
not pragmatics. One can grasp the literal mean-
ing of the sentence “The snow is white”, adding
to it that this sentence is true only if the snow
is  white.  But when a speaker  utters  the sen-
tence “The snow is white”, the hearer needs not
only to understand the literal meaning, because
otherwise he could simply ask “So what?” The
hearer needs also to interpret the statement, in-
ferring what kind of linguistic function this sen-
tence  fulfils.  The  hearer  needs  to  understand
why (or for what purpose) this statement has
been uttered by the speaker. In other words, to
grasp the proper meaning he needs to establish
what pragmatic and epistemic consequences it
has. Thus, the pragmatic consequence is invest-
igated by checking what else the utterance com-
municates, and what the sentence pragmatically
implies.  But  meaning  as  usage  is  not  only  a
matter of implicatures or presuppositions. The
epistemic  consequences  concern  the  setting  of
conditions in which the sentence can be truly
uttered—that  is,  the  background.  To  under-
stand an utterance expressing some kind of in-
tentional state, both speaker and hearer have to
dispose the background, i.e., knowledge-how. In
fact, this is a passive form of knowledge, which
depends on physical and social determinants, on
which  a  subject  has  a  little  influence  and  in
which she is deeply rooted. Such utterances are
evidence of propositional attitudes with certain
representational content. In other words, a sub-
ject  uttering  a  sentence  also  expresses  (using
the terms of  folk psychology)  his  attitude to-
ward its content. However, according to Searle,
propositional  attitudes  are  not  intentional
states, understood as a relation of being direc-
ted (or of taking an attitude, i.e., belief) toward
a judgment in a logical sense, expressed in the
form of a sentence (utterance). “There is indeed
a relation ascribed when one ascribes an Inten-
tional to a person, but is not a relation between
a person and a proposition, rather it is a rela-
tion of  representation between the Intentional
state and the thing represented by it. In other
words, proposition is rather a content of a state-
ment than its object” (Searle 1983, p. 19). 
Searle’s  standpoint  does  not  convince
Beyer, who claims that to express or correctly
ascribe a meaning intention and, consequently,
to grasp the literal truth (the conditional mean-
ing of an assertive utterance) one does not need
to  meet  the  requirements  of  Searle’s  Back-
ground Hypothesis—according to which a sub-
ject  needs  to  dispose  a  set  of  nonrepresenta-
tional  capacities  to  correctly  interpret  the
meaning of utterances. These requirements must
be  fulfilled  only  by  sentences-producers,  who
can be regarded as “experts”—however, not ne-
cessarily in a scientific sense.
4 Meaning and intentionality
As Beyer claims, if the hearer does not recog-
nize  an  intention  accompanying  an  utterance,
she does not fail to grasp the literal truth-condi-
tional meaning of an utterance. Arguing for this
thesis,  Beyer gives examples of sentences that
do not have an established use or that share the
same general meaning function but have differ-
ent respective meanings. But here are some ob-
jections: 
The  first  question  concerns  indexicals:
could we really grasp the literal meaning of the
indexical  “I”  if  we could  not  dispose  a back-
ground  of  self-identification?  In  other  words,
what would be the distinctive features of con-
text that allow the right ascription of beliefs, if
subjects A and B utter the same content, and in
the same context? It might be, for example, a
capacity to identify themselves as subjects of a
certain state, which is a capacity belonging to
the unintentional background. If we do not dis-
pose  a  concept  of  an  individual  subject,  but
only of collectivity, self-identification would be
disturbed. In that case, could we still grasp the
literal meaning of a sentence like “I do x”? Such
self-identification  depends  on  many  factors—
physical,  like a completely unintentional  sense
of  proprioception  or  homeostasis,  and  social,
based on norms and rules. The case of physical
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factors  determining  the  ability  to  self-identify
shows that the Background Hypothesis cannot
be reformulated such that the Background must
contain intentional elements. As Searle writes:
On  the  conception  I  am presenting,  the
Background is rather the set of practices,
skills, habits, and stances that enable In-
tentional contents to work in the various
ways that they do, and it is in that sense
that the Background functions causally by
providing a set of enabling conditions for
the operation of Intentional states. (1983,
p. 158)
Intentional elements would not help our grasp-
ing of the meaning if they referred to subjective
intentions, which, as Beyer admits, are fully ac-
cessible  only  from  first-person  perspective.
Beyer also doubts whether it is possible to make
a  comprehensive  list  of  assumptions  about  a
hidden object. But Searle’s Background Hypo-
thesis was created precisely to avoid such a re-
gress. 
The second question concerns the distinc-
tion  between  literal  and  contextual  meaning.
Namely we can raise the doubt: if a hearer does
not  grasp  the  contextual  meaning,  i.e.,  the
truth-conditional meaning, then might she only
grasp  the sense  of  the  utterance,  and not  its
meaning?  If  we  change  terminology,  and  call
general meaning function “sense” or “concept”,
then we could use Frege’s theory of sense and
meaning (intension and extension) and say that
a  subject  who  grasps  only  conventional  lin-
guistic  meaning  but  not  respective  meaning
grasps  de facto not the meaning of a sentence
but its sense. According to Frege’s theory of in-
tension/extension  of  a  sentence,  one  cannot
know a sentence’s meaning if one does not know
its truth-conditions, because the meaning of a
sentence is its truth-value (Frege 1948). Further,
if we turned to were Frege as interpreted by Mi-
chael  Dummett,  we  could  say  that  a  subject
who does not know the truth-conditions of some
sentence does not understand this sentence, be-
cause,  according  to  Dummett,  a  theory  of
meaning should be a theory of  understanding
(1993). 
The third objection can be formulated as
follows: if, according to Beyer, only a producer
carries  the burden of  the requirements of  the
Background Hypothesis, and if she was a false
expert, is there a method (also accessible to a
hearer  who does not  have to know the back-
ground) for the identification of false experts by
a non-expert? This is a version of Putnam’s ex-
ternalism,  which  says  that  external  factors,
which determine the content of our beliefs could
be  experts,  who  for  example  tell  us  how  to
properly use the names “elm” and “beech” (cf.
Putnam 1975,  p.  145).  But what if  these  ex-
perts just pretend to be professionals, or simply
have a gap in their education?
If only producers should carry the burden
of the requirements of  the Background Hypo-
thesis, consumers would have limited access to
methods enabling the identification of the satis-
faction conditions of an uttered sentence. Hence
consumers, grasping only literal meaning, would
have to believe everything they heard. As was
said, intentionality should not be regarded as a
feature of an individual mind. Intentionality is a
relation between minds and the world. It is a
social  phenomenon,  developed  and  practiced
through interactions with other minds (cf.  To-
masello & Rakoczy 2003). Hence there must be
a theory that can explain how both speaker and
hearer have a potentially equal chance of under-
standing a sentence (of grasping its truth-condi-
tional content). Such a model of understanding
has  been  proposed  by  Christopher  Peacocke.
Peacocke claims that the thinker can only judge
the  content  that  she  recognizes  (cf.  Peacocke
1992, p. 51). Recognition is possible only if the
person  knows  the  truth-conditions  of  the
grasped content. According to Peacocke, the ba-
sic concepts are individuated by the fact that,
in certain circumstances, our beliefs containing
these concepts will be true. These beliefs consti-
tute  the  knowledge  of  the  subject.  Peacocke
builds his theory on the assumption that com-
ponents  of  the  propositional  content  are  con-
cepts  individuated  by  their  possession  condi-
tions, which fix the semantic value of concepts.
The  determination  theory  for  a  given
concept (together with the world in empir-
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ical cases) assigns semantic values in such
a  way  that  the  belief-forming  practices
mentioned in the concept’s possession con-
dition are correct. That is, in the case of
belief  formation,  the  practices  result  in
true beliefs, and in the case of principles of
inference,  they  result  in  truth-preserving
inferences,  when  semantic  values  are  as-
signed in accordance with the determina-
tion theory. (Peacocke 1992, p. 19)
In fact, in such an account, Peacocke’s theory of
knowledge is a theory of social solidarity, where
knowledge is  not  a privilege  and subjects  are
considered not as monads or individual minds
but as creating a new interpersonal subjectivity
—i.e.,  a  social  sphere.  On  the  basis  of  Pea-
cocke’s model of gaining knowledge, which con-
tains the triadic relation: concepts, the posses-
sion condition of concepts, (conditions in which
the  use  of  concept  is  valid),  andthrough  se-
mantic value (fixed on the basis of determina-
tion theory), this solidarity is possible, because
according to this model everyone can verify or
falsify judgments of others. I support this ac-
count. The so-called “theory of social solidarity”
assumes  that  both  speaker  and  hearer  must
share the Background in order to have an access
to conditions of justification of utterances.
From the third objection follows the next
question: if only a producer needs to dispose a
background, then what would be an indicator of
the proper usage of  a sentence? How could a
consumer conclude that a producer understands
the  uttered  sentence  (that  is,  is  a  competent
language user)?
As I have suggested, the consumer also has
to utilise certain methods to conclude whether
the producer understands the uttered sentence.
This tool of verification should be the world, as
in Donald Davidson’s model of epistemic trian-
gulation. In Davidson’s theory, meaning is dis-
positional.  He  claims  that  asymmetry,  which
happens  between  a  speaker  and  interpreter’s
knowledge about a word’s meaning, is the same
kind of  asymmetry between the first-  second-
person perspectives. This means that knowledge
about meaning has to be inferential—hence it is
to be identified by an interpreter on the basis of
the speaker’s behaviour. To understand the be-
haviour of an agent, the interpreter has to have
a  hypothesis  about  her  intention,  and  then
check this  hypothesis  with  respect  to the ex-
ternal conditions of the world. In this way, he
can verify or falsify his interpretation. If  it is
wrong,  then he must  change it  and form an-
other hypothesis. Interpretation should be un-
dertaken  according  to  a  principle  of  charity,
which means that if the hypothesis fails, then it
is  the  probably  the  interpreter  who  is  wrong
and not the sender—here is  the place for ex-
perts—the interpreter has to assume that the
sender acts rationally, but he has tools to prove
it (Davidson 1980). 
But in the context of the Background Hy-
pothesis we do not even need to refer to David-
son’s theory to show the necessity of an external
validation indicator. Searle’s original account is
good enough:
If my beliefs turn out to be wrong, it is
my beliefs and not the world which is at
fault, as is shown by the fact that I can
correct  the  situation  simply by changing
my beliefs.  It is the responsibility of the
belief,  so  to  speak,  to  match  the  world,
and  where  the  match  fails  I  repair  the
situation by changing the belief. But if I
fail to carry out my intentions or if my de-
sires are unfulfilled I cannot in that way
correct  the  situation  by simply changing
the intention or desire. In these cases it is,
so to speak, the fault of the world if it fails
to match the intention or the desire, and I
cannot fix things up by saying it  was a
mistaken intention or desire in a way that
I can fix things up by saying it was a mis-
taken belief. Beliefs like statements can be
true or false, and we might say they have
the ‘mind-to-world’ direction of fit. Desires
and intentions, on the other hand, cannot
be true or false, but can be complied with,
fulfilled, or carried out, and we might say
that they have the ‘world-to-mind’ direc-
tion of fit. (Searle 1983, p. 8)
As I have emphasized, since Background and In-
tentionality  are  strongly  connected  it  is  im-
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possible to weaken the Background or add in-
tentional elements to it, because then the mech-
anism of intentional directedness preserving the
external  and  relational  character  of  proposi-
tional  attitudes  will  fall.  Nevertheless,  Beyer
rightly begins his considerations with a compar-
ison  of  the  conception  of  intentionality  from
Husserl and Searle. What they have common is
the  antipsychological  thesis  that  intentionality
can be expressed in language. Their idea was to
separate  intentionality  from  psychological  ex-
planations, which is possible when we consider
propositional attitudes as reported in sentences
containing the I-clause and the that-clause, thus
expressing a relation between an attitude and a
judgement in a logical sense.  In general,  anti-
psychologists claim that intentionality is a bin-
ary relation between mental acts and the world:
the  contents  of  mental  acts  refer  to  objects,
which exist outside of these acts, while the rela-
tion of intentionality is represented in sentences.
The relational approach to intentionality affects
how we think of mental functions and products,
such as judging, believing, doubting, and so on,
which are themselves relational. 
As Beyer underlines, the problem of mean-
ing intention (termed thus by Husserl) concerns
the partly subjective nature of experienced con-
tent—a factor that creates the content of the
proposition associated with the modality of the
state and allows the subject to grasp the con-
tent of the experienced state. He refers to Franz
Brentano,  according  to  whom every  conscious
mental act is intentional. In other words, con-
sciousness is intentional because it is always a
consciousness of something. Consciousness can-
not exist without an intentional act of directed-
ness toward itself.  This means that character-
istic of mental phenomena is their intentionality
or  the  “mental  inexistence  of  an  object  [and
that] every mental phenomenon includes some-
thing as object within itself” (Brentano 1973).
So, for example, if I hear a sound, I also grasp
the phenomenon of hearing. On the other hand,
the content of a mental state is characterized as
that which can be expressed in an objectively-
verifiable judgment, due to the specific nature
of the content which allows the subject to move
from first-order  beliefs  to  second-order  beliefs
that arise when she ascribes to herself a propos-
itional attitude. This switch can be seen as a
change in the form of language: from object lan-
guage referring to the external world to—and
here are two possibilities—either metalanguage,
in which the subject reports that she has a be-
lief about having a belief, or to subjective lan-
guage, in which the subject reports having an
attitude with a certain content. In the case of
metalanguage, this has to do with issues of se-
mantic externalism, like inheriting truthfulness
by second-order beliefs. 
Meaning exists only where there is a dis-
tinction  between  intentional  content  and
the form of its externalization, and to ask
for  the  meaning  is  to  ask  for  an  Inten-
tional content that goes with the form of
externalization. (Searle 1983, p. 28)
Since propositional attitudes are mental states
with  propositional  content,  to  interpret  them
correctly  one  has  to  dispose  a  background of
physical and social determinants of the content
of the sentences expressing the propositional at-
titude.  This  is  why a proper theory of  inten-
tional  directedness  should  treat  both  speaker
and hearer equally. Speaker and hearer cannot
be separated.  They are so strongly  connected
that they should be considered holistically as a
single intentional structure or one structure of
intentional directedness. Only then arises social
intersubjectivity, which does not consist only of
individual  minds  but  also  of  interactions
between  minds  and  world  as  in  Davidson’s
model of triangulation. This relation works for
both  sides.  And  the  constitution  of  an  indi-
vidual self is an effect of switching between in-
dividual and social minds and between the be-
liefs of these two kinds: social and individual. It
happens for example when an individual mind
joints a group and meets regularities different to
her own (cf. Tomasello et al. 2005). This means
that sometimes, for some reason, it is useful for
her to change her beliefs or even her belief-sys-
tem. She must do this on the basis of her own
inferences, so she has to have a reason to do it.
Done in any other way she would have problems
with understanding this new beliefs.
Pacholik-Żuromska, A. (2015). Grasping Meaning - A Commentary on Christian Beyer.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 4(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570535 7 | 9
www.open-mind.net
Hence the triadic model of intentional ref-
erence contains a structure that simulates rela-
tions  of  understanding  between  sender,  inter-
preter, and the world. Subjects never live a sol-
itary life, as is claimed by Husserl. That is why
the case of intentionality does not concern a sol-
itary mind. This standpoint gives a straightfor-
ward route to contemporary theories of enactive
cognition,  where a subject  is  embedded in an
environment and, to gain knowledge, has to act
and interact with the world of objects and other
subjects.  This  point  of  view,  however,  leaves
little room for epistemological internalism and
thus for the Cartesian mind. Followers of theor-
ies of enactivism would say that the content of
a subject’s mental states is deeply rooted in the
body’s interactions with the environment—be-
cause the whole of cognition is.
That  is  why  when  one  investigates  the
content of mental states one needs to refer to
both  the  situation  and  the  situated  cognizer
taken  together  as  a  single,  unified  system
(Wilson 2002). Such enactive theories will be a
kind of new version of active externalism, which
assumes that  “the content-fixing  properties  in
the environment are active properties within a
sensorimotor loop realized in the very present”
(Metzinger 2004, p. 115). This standpoint, how-
ever controversial in the light of classic external-
ism, has much in common with proponents of
this view. So, for example, diachronic external-
ism holds that the causal story, namely all facts
in the past that have had an influence on the
thinker, together with an environment, are im-
portant  determinants  of  the  content  of  a
thinker’s propositional attitudes. In contrast to
this, synchronic externalism holds also that the
content of propositional attitudes is determined
by the current environment of the thinker and
his disposition to respond to it. On the other
hand, social externalism holds that the content
of thoughts is determined in part by the social
environment of a thinker, and especially by how
others in our linguistic communities use words.
These “others” could be experts, who establish
the scientific names of objects, such as, for ex-
ample, trees. This version of social externalism
could prove fruitful when we consider Searle’s
Background Theory, but it creates trouble for
Beyer. As I have argued above, in the third ob-
jection, externalism is the right approach but it
is possible only under the condition of the equal
treatment of  both participants of  the commu-
nication  process,  namely  the  speaker  and
hearer, and only when they have access to the
background.
5 Conclusion
To  conclude,  the  idea  of  neo-Husserlian  ap-
proach  to  meaning  combined  with  Searle’s
Background Hypothesis seems to be promising.
However, there are several questions that need
to be answered. The main problem seems to be
the postulated restriction of the hypothesis by
adding intentional elements and an abolition of
its requirements for a hearer. It would be then a
new  hypothesis,  and  rather  more  Husserlian
than Searlian. These requirements may impair
the  triadic  relation  of  intentional  reference,
which has to remain triadic if we do not want
to come back to idea of a Cartesian mind. 
I  have  raised  four  objections  to  Beyer’s
claim about the restriction of  the Hypothesis,
concerning the problem of  indexicals,  the dis-
tinction between literal and contextual meaning,
semantic  and  social  externalism,  and  under-
standing as an epistemic triangle.  In the first
objection about the use of indexical “I” we have
asked whether we could really grasp the literal
meaning of the indexical “I” if we didn’t have a
background of self-identification. I have argued
that in the proper use of the pronoun “I” we
need a special, non-intentional background. The
second  objection  concerned  the  problem  of
whether a hearer, who does not grasp the con-
textual meaning, grasps only the sense of utter-
ance but not its literal meaning. Answering this
question, I claimed that in some approaches—
such as, for example, the Dummetian version of
Frege’s sense and meaning—a subject who does
not know the truth-conditions of some sentence
does  not  understand  the  sentence.  The  third
and  fourth  objection  concerned  the  restricted
role of the hearer in the act of communication. I
raised a doubt about whether it is possible to
identify  false  experts  and to recognize incom-
petent language users if the hearer (interpreter)
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lacks  a  non-intentional  background.  I  claimed
that  to  do  this,  the  relation  of  intentionality
must  contain  three  elements:  speaker,  hearer,
and world, where both hearer and speaker have
equal access to the background. The relation of
intentionality  has  been  considered  to  be
strongly  connected  with  the  model  of  under-
standing, where speaker  and hearer  make one
unified  structure  of  intentional  directness.  In
such an account, the requirements of the Back-
ground Hypothesis  cannot  be  restricted  solely
to producers, as Beyer would have it.
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